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Abstract: Judges articulate their role in controversial cases of medical ethics in terms of deference to 
Parliament, lest their personal morality be improperly brought to bear. This hides a wide range of 
law-making activities, as Parliamentary sovereignty is diffused by ‘intermediate law-makers’, and 
judicial activity is more subtle than the deference account implies. The nature of litigation raises 
questions about the contributions of other legal personnel and also the nature of the parties’ 
interests in test-cases. While judges demonstrate an awareness of some of these issues and anxiety 
about the constitutional legitimacy of their work, a more nuanced account is needed of their proper 
role. This may be built on Austin’s theory of tacit legislation. It may draw from human rights law. 
However, considerable work is required before the complexities of hidden law-making can be 
properly incorporated into the province of medical jurisprudence.    
 
                                                          
1 This paper is drawn from the preparation for and reflection on a workshop held by the Health Ethics and Law 
research group of the University of Southampton in May 2011. We are grateful for the funding generously 
provided by the Modern Law Review for this key event, and especially to the workshop participants for their 
contributions to our thinking.  
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Introduction 
This paper is concerned with some questions about the  constitutional legitimacy of judicial law-
making the context of medical and health care law.2 It draws attention to a range of problems that 
are created by the way in which the law is developed outside of Parliamentary processes and 
identifies questions for further consideration if this fuller picture of law-making processes is 
acknowledged The issues that it addresses may be more general ones, concerning the role of 
litigation and other forms of ‘hidden’ lawmaking in the development of law on issues that are 
controversial in a pluralist society.. We consider in our conclusions whether there are reasons to 
think the context in which we have examined them is unusual .  
Medical and health care lawyers have long seen the law as a tool for promoting their interpretations 
of the  requirements of bioethics and patients’ rights - and hence their focus has often been on what 
the law ‘should’ be – but, in contrast, they have shown comparatively little interest in whether it 
matters that reform is introduced via the judiciary rather than through the legislature, despite the 
constitutional issues raised by judicial ‘lawmaking’. Indeed, the dominance of legal positivism in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence in the latter half of the Twentieth Century led to considerable 
discomfort over the role of judges in making law.3 The development of Ronald Dworkin’s influential 
account of adjudication as the expression of deep principles, on which the integrity of law is based,4 
can be seen as an attempt to rescue judges from the criticism that they lack constitutional 
legitimacy. Rather than ‘legislating’ in such cases, as H.L.A. Hart suggested (because they concern 
issues on which the voice of Parliament is silent), Dworkin argued that they use the resources of the 
law to determine the solutions that best fit the authority of the legal tradition that has been handed 
to them. Hence, the legitimacy of judicial pronouncements is derived from the authority of law, not 
from that of the individual judges, and adjudication is based on the application of legal principle 
rather than development of political policy.5 As we show below, judicial anxiety about the possibility 
that they might go beyond their legitimate role in dealing with controversial medico-legal issues 
indicates that the Dworkinian thesis has clear resonances with the thinking of judges in this area. 
In practice, the process by which medical law is made is far more complex than can be accounted for 
by this distinction between legislative and adjudicative functions. Penney Lewis has shown how legal 
change can be achieved without formal legal interventions that can be neatly analysed as the action 
of an authorised legislator, even a constitutionally problematic law-maker such as a judge.6 She 
traces the process by which contraceptive sterilisations moved from being considered unlawful prior 
to the 1960s to being retrospectively acknowledged as being lawful in the National Health Service 
(Family Planning) Amendment Act 1972. She shows how by 1968 ‘a substantial medico-legal 
                                                          
2 For the purposes of this paper, we use the term ‘medical law’ as a convenient label to encompass the subset 
of health care law that is usually understood to be concerned with issues of ethical rather than political or 
organisational significance. Health care law is more concerned with the relationship between citizens and the 
organisations that provide health services. For discussion of these ways of subdividing the law, see J . 
Montgomery Health Care Law (2003) pp 1-2; T. Hervey and J. McHale, ‘Law, Health and the European Union’, 
(2005) LS 25(2) 228-259.  
3 A classic account of the positivist approach is J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1995, original edition published 1832), and for a Twentieth Century restatement, 
see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1961). 
4
 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana 1986). 
5
 For this distinction, see R. Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’ in Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1977), 81-130. 
6
 P. Lewis, ‘Legal Change on Contraceptive Sterilisation’ J Leg Hist (2011) 32:3, 295-317. 
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consensus had emerged’ that sterilisation operations for contraceptive rather than therapeutic 
purposes was lawful. This view supplanted the contrary consensus that had existed at the beginning 
of the decade, illustrated by the notorious (and controversial, even at the time) view of Lord 
Denning that:   
Take a case where a sterilisation operation is done so as to enable a man to have the 
pleasure of sexual intercourse, without shouldering the responsibilities attaching to it. The 
operation then is plainly injurious to the public interest. It is degrading to the man himself. It 
is injurious to his wife and to any woman whom he may marry, to say nothing of the way it 
opens to licentiousness; and, unlike contraceptives, it allows no room for a change of mind 
on either side. It is illegal, even though the man consents to it.7 
The way in which this legal change was brought about included a range of social, ethical and legal 
activities. The fact that the contemporary acceptability of eugenic concerns was thought to 
legitimise some non-therapeutic sterilisations assisted the consideration of other social reasons for 
performing sterilisations. The British Medical Association and the Medical Defence Union obtained 
counsels’ opinions on various issues, which gained influence through publication in medical 
professional journals and annual reports.8 When the advice that supported the legality of the 
procedure went unchallenged, it was suggested that this gave it the status of an established view.9 
This was reinforced by debate in the Lancet, British Medical Journal, and the lay press.10 
Lewis notes Ian Kennedy’s description of this process as ‘one of the wonderful examples of the 
fudge-and-nudge development of English law. There was no town crier. It was not really written up 
in the books. The whole legal attitude towards sterilization simply had changed.’11 However, as she 
shows this does not mean that the process was accidental. A substantial campaign was undertaken 
by a non-government organisation, the Simon Population Trust, to achieve its desired outcome. Also 
significantly, the issue was deliberately kept away from formal legal processes because it was 
thought that a test case might lead to an adverse decision.12 The possibility of influencing the law in 
this way raises very significant concerns about the constitutional legitimacy of informal law-making 
that has received insufficient attention.  
This paper uses examples from medical law to explore the complexities of contemporary law-making 
and seeks to refine the issues that need to be resolved in order to explain the constitutionality of the 
process. The broadly Austinian, positivist, assumptions on which the judges rely when they explain 
their role breaks down on at least two counts. First, the complexity of the processes by which legal 
norms are established. This requires careful consideration of the nature and identity of the 
‘sovereign’ legislator who is assumed by Austin’s account of the separation of powers. Second, a 
much richer understanding is needed of the various forces at play in ‘test case’ litigation in which 
judicial decisions come to establish legal principles rather than merely apply them. These are not 
limited to the choices made by judges in adjudicating on ambiguities in the law. The framing of their 
                                                          
7 Bravery v Bravery [1954] 1 WLR 1169, at 1180. 
8 Lewis notes this being done in 1925, 1939, 1949, 1960; see especially n 6 above, 305-6. 
9 Lewis particularly notes this assertion by Philip H. Addison (secretary, MDU) in ‘Voluntary Sterilization in the 
Male’, [1968] 2 BMJ 702 (15 June 1968). 
10 Lewis, n 6 above, 310-131. 
11
 I. Kennedy, ‘Emerging Problems of Medicine, Technology, and the Law’, in I. Kennedy, Treat Me Right: essays 
in medical law and ethics, Oxford, 1988, 10–11.  
12
 Lewis, n 6 above, 315-6. 
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choices is a crucial element in their decision and the ‘process of production’ by which cases come to 
be selected and brought before the court also serves to shape the legal possibilities in a way that can 
be seen as a component of law-making with constitutional implications. The seeds of a constitutional 
solution may be found in Austin’s account, but it will require considerable development to take 
account of modern law-making processes. 
 
Part 1: The changing shape of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
 
Arguably, one reason why judicial and informal  law-making have been under-explored by medical 
and health care lawyers is that over the last few decades this area has become increasingly 
dominated by legislation, and therefore subject to the oversight of Parliament. In some areas, case 
law has been superseded by statute. The foundations of mental health law were radically re-
orientated around the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the 
early 1980s, following a series of test cases, and reviewed again in 2007.13 Somewhat belatedly, the 
law relating to capacity to consent to treatment and the care of adults who are unable to consent 
was codified in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Broadly speaking, this Act gave Parliamentary 
authority to principles that had been created in the courts and, in doing so, obviated the need to 
consider whether or not the judges should have developed them. The promise of legislation had 
been held out for fifteen years through various consultation processes,  14 and it made sense to look 
to Parliament rather than the judges to take the law forward.  
In other areas of medical and health care law statutory regulation has long been the norm, although 
the extent of continuing Parliamentary oversight has proved variable. By way of example, the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (amended in 2008) provided a reasonably 
comprehensive framework, based on broadly consistent principles, under which medically assisted 
reproduction and embryo research could take place. Concerns over the terms of the law were raised 
within and without the courts, but it was reasonably anticipated that reform would be made by 
Parliament when a number of reviews were sponsored by Government (signalling an intention to 
                                                          
13 The Mental Health Act 1983 consolidated the law following the Mental Health (Amendment) Act 1982; it in 
turn was amended by the Mental Health Act 2007. 
14 Prompted by a discussion document produced by the Law Society (Decision Making and Mental Incapacity: 
A Discussion Document, 1989), the Law Commission launched a series of consultations on various aspects of 
(in)capacity (Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making – An Overview, Consultation Paper No. 119, 
1991; Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: A New Jurisdiction, Consultation paper No. 128, 
1993; Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: Medical Treatment and Research, Consultation 
Paper No. 129, 1993; Mentally Incapacitated and Other Vulnerable Adults: Public Law Protection, Consultation 
Paper No. 130, 1993).  Their research culminated in the Report on Mental Incapacity (Law Com Report No. 
231) in February 1995. In response the (then) Lord Chancellor’s Department published a Green Paper ‘Who 
Decides? Making Decisions on Behalf of Mentally Incapacitated Adults’ (Cm 3803, 1997), followed by a White 
Paper entitled 'Making Decisions: The Government’s Proposals for making Decisions on Behalf of Mental 
Incapacitated Adults’' (Cm4465, 1999).  In June 2003 the draft Mental Incapacity Bill (Cm 5859-I & II) was 
produced. A Joint Committee of both Houses scrutinised it and reported in November 2003 (HL Paper 189-I & 
HC 1083-I), the Government responded in February 2004 (Cm 6121); the renamed Mental Capacity Bill was 
introduced in Parliament on 17 June 2004; and eventually received Royal Assent on 7 April 2005.  
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make changes via the legislature).15 An expectation of democratic oversight had been built into the 
statutory framework, which required the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), the 
regulatory body established under the 1990 Act, to produce an Annual Report to be laid before 
Parliament, thereby enabling intervention should its activities be found inappropriate.16 Thus, 
Parliament may have permitted the HFEA to develop the detail of the law but it also provided its 
democratic legitimacy. In 1990, it was content to delegate significant discretion over policy to the 
HFEA.17 However, the political acceptability of this delegation became problematic in the 2000s and 
the legislature reclaimed some responsibility for the oversight of this contentious area, albeit 
following some initial reluctance.18 We shall return to some of the issues around such ‘intermediate’ 
law-makers later in this piece. 
Further examples of Parliamentary intervention include the Human Tissue Act 2004, which saw a 
comprehensive response to the regulation of transplant services, codifying and reforming the 
previously fragmented law based on private members’ bills;19 and also the ‘Clinical Trials 
Regulations’ (2004) which have given a more robust and comprehensive legal foundation to the 
work of research ethics committees.20 The consolidation (with little reform) of a century of public 
health law into the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 has been revisited and modernised in 
the Health and Social Care Act 2008; and the fragmented legislative provisions that governed the 
National Health Service were comprehensively consolidated in 2006, only to be substantially 
amended once more under the Cameron administration with the passing of the Health and Social 
Care Act 2012. Finally, the bodies that regulate the Health Professions have had their constitutions, 
powers and procedures revisited under section 60 of the Health Act 1999.21 While the revisions are 
                                                          
15
 Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payment and Regulation (1998) Cm 
4068 and Consent and the law: review of the current provisions in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990 for the UK Health Ministers (1997) Human Reproduction Update Vol. 3, No. 6, 593–621. The latter was 
prompted by the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex p 
Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687 which condoned an apparently illegal harvesting of sperm on the basis that it would 
not reoccur; but note L v HFEA and Secretary of State for Health [2008] EWHC 2149 (Fam), [2009] 1 FCR 138.  
16 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 7(3). 
17 J. Montgomery, ‘Rights, Restraints and Pragmatism: The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990’ 
(1991) MLR 54(4) 524-534. 
18 The Parliamentary review of this Act was initially prompted by the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee in October 2003, when it announced its intention to undertake an inquiry into this 
field, in light of the ‘limp response’ of the Department of Health to its earlier Report on this area. See further 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, HC 7-
1 2004-5, and C. Jones, ‘Exploring the Routes from Consultation to (In)forming Public Policy’, in M. Freeman 
(ed) Current Legal Issues: Law and Bioethics, (OUP, 2008), 257-285.  
19 Human Tissue Act 1961, Human Organs Transplant Act 1989. In 2013, the Government announced its 
intention to revisit the 2004 Act; see Department of Health, Government response to the report of the 
independent review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and the Human Tissue Authority by 
Justin McCracken, London 2013, para 11. 
20 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/1031, which transposed into domestic 
law the EU Clinical Trials Directive (2001/20/EC); see H. Biggs, Healthcare Research Ethics and Law: Regulation, 
Review and Responsibility (Routledge 2009), especially chapter 4.  
21
 See also the NHS Reform and Health Professions Act 2002, which created what is now the Professional 
Standards Authority (originally entitled the Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals, then 
known as the Council for Health Care Regulatory Excellence). 
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approved by statutory instrument, rather than primary legislation, Parliamentary oversight is 
nevertheless maintained.22 
 
Intermediate authorities and the making of ‘soft-law’: ‘authorised’ law-makers? 
A common feature of many of these legislative interventions is the creation of intermediate 
authorities, such as the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, the Human Tissue Authority, 
Research Ethics Committees (now under the umbrella of the Health Research Authority, a position to 
be fully regularised under the Care Bill 2013), and the various professional regulators. These 
intermediate authorities have important functions and powers to establish legal norms. Such ‘soft 
law’ has come to play a very important role in health care law. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
the subject cannot be fully understood without appreciating that it is a combination of hard law and 
collegiate norms.23 This is partly because the National Health Service creates its own internal norms 
to support staff in both legal compliance and meeting good practice standards.24 It is also a 
consequence of the fact that professional regulatory bodies have statutory responsibilities to issue 
guidance on ethics and practice,25 coupled with the tendency of the judges to integrate that 
guidance into their analysis of the law.26 Finally, many of the bodies established to license and 
oversee areas of health care practice have developed guidance and codes of practice to assist those 
within their jurisdictions. The processes by which such ‘soft law’ has been made deserve analysis, 
and it is not always clear who the key influencers are. Once again, there is a process of law-making 
that is not easy to place within the traditional accounts of how law is created and the conditions that 
legitimise its production.  
The authority and responsibility of these law-makers is recognised in law, but it is not always so clear 
how to assess whether they have carried out their tasks appropriately. Some assistance can be 
found in the public law principles used to regulate discretionary power, litigated via actions for 
judicial review, such as the doctrine of ultra vires. However this gives only a partial account of the 
legitimacy issues. A brief consideration of how these intermediate authorities have carried out their 
lawmaking functions gives some insights into the questions that need to be addressed. 
‘Law-making’ by interpretative elaboration 
The HFEA is the regulatory body responsible for providing guidance and elaboration on the meaning 
of statutory provisions pertaining to the use of gametes and embryos in fertility treatment and 
research, under the auspices of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Acts of 1990 and 2008. It is 
                                                          
22 The Law Commission was asked to consider this area, and consulted on the Regulation of Health and Social 
Care Professionals between 1 March and 31 May 2012. See further  
http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/areas/Healthcare_professions.htm (last visited 26 July 2013).  
23 J. Montgomery, 'Time for a Paradigm Shift? Medical Law in Transition' in Freeman, M (ed) Current Legal 
Problems 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 363-408. 
24 See for example Department of Health, Reference guide to consent for examination or treatment (Second 
edition London DH 2009); Confidentiality: NHS Code of Practice (London DH 2003); Confidentiality: NHS Code of 
Practice Supplementary Guidance: Public Interest Disclosures (London DH 2010). 
25 See, for example, the Medical Act 1983, s 35. 
26 See J. Montgomery, ‘Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26(2) LS 185-210 for a sympathetic 
account of this tendency, and for a more critical one, J. Miola ‘Medical law and medical ethics – 
complementary or corrosive?’ (2004) 6 Med L Int 251-274, and J. Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law (Hart 
2007). 
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required by law to develop a Code of Practice issued to licensed clinics working in these fields,27 but 
this does not explain the processes and choices that are made in developing the guidance. The 
interpretation of the welfare principle contained within the Act serves by way of example. The 
statute originally stipulated that “A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless 
account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment, 
(including the need of that child for a father), and of any other child who may be affected by the 
birth”;28 and further specified that the Code of Practice shall include guidance on child welfare 
matters.29 Although the welfare aspect proved to be a contentious provision,30 the HFEA’s role was 
(and remains) to provide guidance on what clinics must do in order to meet the statutory 
requirements. Hence, in the first Code of Practice, it was stated that clinics ought to ‘take a medical 
and social history from each prospective parent’, each of whom should be seen separately and 
together, and enquiries should be made with their GP to ensure there were no further factors which 
might render them unsuitable for treatment, and a list of relevant factors to be considered was 
provided.31 While some changes were made to this text over the course of the next few editions, up 
to and including the sixth version of the Code, the mandated approach largely remained the same.  
In the summer of 2004 the HFEA began work on developing new guidance on the child welfare 
provision. The consultation phase was launched in January 2005 by Dame Suzie Leather, (then) the 
Chair of the HFEA, who noted that it ‘was drafted more than a decade ago and has not been properly 
reviewed since. The time to review this guidance is now long overdue.’32 This review was undertaken 
in the knowledge that the Department of Health would soon launch its own review of the legislation, 
with the expectation that it would include consideration of the welfare provision.33 Although the 
document clearly stated that the HFEA could not amend the statute, and that the ‘primary purpose’ 
of the consultation was not to ‘solicit suggestions on how the Act might be amended’, nevertheless 
there was an invitation to comment on the welfare principle (‘we welcome views on the welfare 
principle itself’).34 The consultation posited a range of positions for most questions, from the least 
interventionist, ‘minimum’ threshold where only risks of serious medical harm should be protected 
against (including, interestingly, the option that ‘no welfare of the child enquiries should be made’, 
question 2a – clearly in contravention of the statutory language); to a ‘maximalist’ threshold with 
follow ups to GPs and other agencies routinely (question 2e), and consideration of physical, medical, 
psychological harms and social circumstances to be taken into account (question 4c).  
                                                          
27
 HFEA 1990, s 25(1); to be approved by the Secretary of State under HFEA 1990, s 26.  
28 HFEA 1990, s 13(5). 
29 HFEA 1990, s 25(2).  
30 E. Jackson, ‘Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle’ (2002) MLR 65(2) 176-203; J. Wallbank 
‘The Role of Rights and Utility in Instituting a Child’s Right to Know Her Genetic History’ (2004) S & LS 13(2) 
245-264; A. Alghrani and J. Harris ‘Reproductive liberty: should the foundation of families be regulated?’ 
(2006) CFLQ 18(2) 191-210. For a contrary view see J. A. Laing and D. S. Oderberg ‘Artificial reproduction, the 
“welfare principle”, and the common good’ (2005) Med L Rev 13(3) 328-356. 
31 HFEA, Code of Practice, First Edition, Part 3, para 3.18-3.19. The full child welfare guidance can be found in 
Part 3, 3.i-3.x. All previous editions can be found on the HFEA website, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2999.html 
(last visited 27 July 2013).  
32 HFEA, Tomorrow’s Children: A consultation on guidance to licensed fertility clinics on taking in account the 
welfare of children to be born of assisted conception treatment, (2005), foreword.  
33
 Ibid, para 1.1.  
34
 Ibid; see also question 9, 22.  
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In November 2005, the HFEA announced the outcome of its review,35 signalling a clear shift to a 
‘presumption’ in favour of treatment, unless there was evidence that the child to be born, or any 
existing child of the family, was likely to suffer serious harm, in language akin to the threshold 
criteria for child care cases;36 and accordingly the revised guidance saw the removal of the 
requirement for clinics to consult patients’ GPs.37 This paradigm shift in the interpretation of the 
statute38 was grounded on the views expressed by respondents, which the HFEA classified into four 
categories; two of which (its removal, or fortification into the paramount consideration) would 
require legislative amendment and were therefore simply noted and left aside.39 Of the remaining 
categories, the pivotal point was the typification of the level of responsibility of the medical team – 
either ‘some’ or ‘significant’ responsibility towards the child(ren) in question (whether those to be 
born, or already in the family). The former approach favoured patient autonomy, with refusals only 
occurring where serious physical or psychological harm was likely to occur. The latter focused 
greater attention on the clinics being satisfied that the child’s welfare would not be negatively 
impacted, and was considered by the HFEA to be too similar to the (then) current guidance, and said 
to have ‘placed too much emphasis upon the interests of the prospective child at the expense of 
patient choice’.40 Noting only that ‘the experience of the past 14 years suggests that’ children 
conceived through licensed treatment do not appear to be more likely to be ‘disadvantaged’ than 
their peers, the HFEA concluded that a shift in favour of a presumption of treatment was justified 
and appropriate.  
The key point for our purpose is that the law in this area was changed as a result of the HFEA’s 
‘interpretive elaboration’, in the absence of any statutory amendment. It is clear that the HFEA 
exercised choice in developing the guidance, and that this was a law-making choice. It altered the 
substantive rules by which the conduct of fertility services were governed, rules that were backed by 
regulatory sanctions. 
 
‘Law-making’ by regulatory decision 
Regulatory decision-making, with regard to both the determination of the ambit of an authorised 
body’s remit and the outcome of applications for licences (or permission) to develop novel 
techniques for use in research, also has the potential to establish principles pertinent to future 
applications and may prove influential in subsequent legislative amendments by Parliament.  Hence, 
                                                          
35
 HFEA, Tomorrow’s Children Report of the policy review of the welfare of the child assessments in licensed 
assisted conception clinics, (November 2005), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/TomorrowsChildren_report.pdf 
(last visited 27 July 2013). For further discussion see C. Jones Why Donor Insemination Requires Developments 
in Family Law: the need for new definitions of parenthood, (Edwin Mellen Press 2007), 211-216. 
36
 Children Act 1989, s31.  
37 The HFEA 1990, s 13(5) (as amended by the HFEA 2008), now makes reference to ‘need of that child for 
supportive parenting’ rather than to ‘a father’, but the presumption in favour of treatment is similarly evident 
in the current Code of Practice, 8th edition, as amended, para 8.11, which states: ‘It is presumed that all 
prospective parents will be supportive parents, in the absence of any reasonable cause for concern that any 
child who may be born, or any other child, may be at risk of significant harm or neglect.’ See further J. 
McCandless and S. Sheldon, ‘"No Father Required?" The Welfare Assessment in the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act (2008)’ (2010) Fem LS 18(3) 201-225. 
38
 Evident in the language adopted in the 7
th
 edition of the Code of Practice, n 31 above, G3 - G3.5.1. 
39
 HFEA, n 35 above, 6.  
40
 Ibid. 
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such decisions can also be viewed as a form of law-making. Again illustrative examples can be found 
within the work of the HFEA.41  
The first relates to the regulation of sex-selection in assisted conception. Despite significant debate 
of this issue before and during the passage of the HFEA 1990, no statutory provisions were made. 
The HFEA first consulted in 1993, and ultimately decided not to license sex-testing for ‘social 
reasons’, but did permit the use of PGD and sex selection for medical reasons.42 In 2002 the Minister 
for Public Health requested a review of sex selection techniques and regulation, and following public 
consultation the HFEA reiterated its 1993 stance.43 This issue was raised in the House of Lords 
decision in R (on the application of Quintavalle) v HFEA44, wherein the appellant Josephine 
Quintavalle (on behalf of Comment on Reproductive Ethics (CORE)) sought to challenge whether the 
HFEA had the power to license the use of PGD together with HLA typing. Although this case was not 
about sex-selection per se, Lord Hoffmann utilised it as a useful illustration for his conclusion that 
the absence of statutory prohibition(s) implied that ‘Parliament intended to leave the matter to the 
[HFE] authority (sic) to decide’.45 The HFEA’s policy was subsequently placed on a statutory footing 
by the 2008 amendments to the HFEA 1990;46 hence its stance was retrospectively authorised by 
Parliament. This raises the possibility that the legitimation of the regulatory law-making lay in the 
Parliamentary oversight, but it needs to be recognised that the position was already ‘law’ before the 
2008 Act was passed - as a result of the regulatory decision. 
The second and third examples concern the HFEA’s licensing decisions regarding the use of particular 
types of embryos in research (hybrid embryos and mitochondrial donation/replacement therapy). 
The HFEA identified hybrid or inter-species embryos as a ‘medium priority’ issue in its horizon 
                                                          
41
 A similar analysis might also be applied to the regulation of the number of embryos or eggs that can be 
transferred during a single cycle. In 1987, in response to evidence that a number of centres had been replacing 
more than four eggs/embryos, the Voluntary Licensing Authority clarified its original guidance to make clear 
that no more than three, or exceptionally four, eggs or embryos should be transferred (Voluntary Licensing 
Authority for Human In Vitro Fertilisation and Embryology, 1987: 8, 12, 35: para 12). Morgan and Lee note that 
the transfer of up to 15 eggs had been ‘publicly acknowledged’ in GIFT (gamete intra-fallopian transfer) cycles 
(D. Morgan and R. G. Lee, Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, Blackstone, 
1991: 135). GIFT remains outside the HFEA’s remit. Morgan and Lee indicate that ‘one forceful reason’ for this 
omission was to ensure the compliance of medical professionals with regard to other aspects of the legislation; 
if true, they argued, this would be ‘another example of the clinical profession dominating input into the 
legislative process (ibid: 135).  There is at least one recorded suggestion of clinicians refusing to accept this 
policy (Ms Harman, Human Fertilisation and Embryology, HC Deb 04 February 1988 vol 126 cc1198-256: 1249) 
and the VLA withdrew their licence of approval (F. Price, ‘Establishing guidelines: regulation and the clinical 
management of infertility’ in R. Lee and D. Morgan (eds) Birthrights: Law and Ethics at the Beginnings of Life 
Routlege 1989: 37-54, esp 42-44). In its first Code of Practice, the HFEA set a limit of three eggs/embryos per 
cycle (para 7.6); a policy which remained unchanged when later – and unsuccessfully - challenged by Mr 
Taranissi in R (on the app of the Assisted Reproduction and Gynaecology Centre and another) v HFEA [2002] 
EWCA Civ 20, [2003] 1 FCR 266. In this example there were no legislative changes, but the regulatory decisions 
of the VLA and the HFEA both brought about a change in norms that proved difficult to challenge.  
42 HFEA, Code of Practice (5th ed, 2001) para 9.9.  
43HFEA, Sex-Selection: Options for regulation, at  www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Final_sex_selection_main_report.pdf 
(last visited 27 July 2013).  
44
 [2005] UKHL 28.  
45
 Ibid, at [29]. Under HFEA 1990, Schedule 2, s.1(1)(d).  
46
 HFEA 1990 (as amended), Schedule 2, s. 1ZA(1)(c).   
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scanning process during 2004-05.47 In November 2006, a month before the DH’s proposals for 
reform of the HFEA 1990 were published,48 the HFEA received two research licence applications 
from researchers wishing to use hybrid embryos for specific projects. The HFEA released a statement 
indicating that this type of research ‘would potentially fall with(sic) the remit of the HFEA to regulate 
and licence and would not be prohibited by the legislation’;49 but prior to deciding whether or not to 
grant the requisite licences it undertook an extensive public consultation, summarised in the 
resulting report.50 Almost simultaneously, and reportedly as a consequence of these developments, 
the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee decided to undertake an urgent inquiry 
into this issue and its Report was published on April 5 2007,51 followed shortly by the Draft Bill in 
May 2007. On January 17 2008 the HFEA announced its decision to grant licences to Newcastle 
University and King’s College London, prior to completion of the passage of the relevant Bill through 
Parliament. This raises an issue of sequencing in the law-making process – a reflection which formed 
an aspect of the (unsuccessful) application for judicial review by CORE and the Christian Legal 
Centre, that ‘it was irrational to grant the licence before waiting to see what the will of Parliament 
was; [and] that to do so, was usurping legitimate debate and the decision of Parliament’.52  
The final example is mitochondrial donation/replacement therapy53 involving human embryos. Here 
the licensing decision was taken much earlier (in 2005), but the amendments made by the 2008 
legislation only provided for possible future permissive regulations under delegated legislation (akin 
to the removal of donor anonymity under the HFEA 1990). Since 2010 three key UK policy-
advisors/makers, notably the Human Genetics Commission (HGC),54 Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA)55 and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCOB)56 have considered the 
policy implications of permitting the use of these techniques in treatment cycles. The NCOB reported 
its findings on June 12, 2012.57 The HFEA, together with Sciencewise-ERC,58  launched its public 
consultation on the ethical issues raised by these techniques in September, and made 
                                                          
47 A full chronology is available: HFEA, 2007, Hybrids and Chimeras: A report on the findings of the consultation, 
Appendix A: 24-27, at  www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Hybrids_Report.pdf, (last visited 27 July 2013). 
48 DH, Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: proposals for revised legislation (including 
establishment of the Regulatory Authority for Tissue and Embryos), Cm 6989, December 2006. 
49 www.hfea.gov.uk/474.html (last visited 27 July 2013).  
50 HFEA, n47 above, Chapter 4.   
51 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Government proposals for the regulation of hybrid 
and chimera embryos (Fifth Report of Session 2006-07), HC 272-1, para 1-3. 
52
 R (On the application of Quintavalle and CLC) v HFEA [2008] EWHC 3395 (Admin), [17]; but see [22], [33].  
53 The NCOB referred to these techniques as mitochondrial donation, whereas latterly the HFEA used the term 
mitochondrial replacement, and in the most recent coverage the phrase mitochondrial replacement therapy 
has emerged; see C. Jones and I. Holme, ‘Relatively (im)material: mtDNA and genetic relatedness in law and 
policy’ (2013) Life Sciences, Society and Policy 9(4) 1-14.  
54 HGC (2010) Discussion of Ethical Issues in Human Reproduction Using Materials Containing DNA From More 
Than Two Sources, HGC10/P07 Annex A.  
55 HFEA (2011) Scientific review of the safety and efficacy of methods to avoid mitochondrial disease through 
assisted conception, at www.hfea.gov.uk/6372.html (last visited 27 July 2013). 
56 NCOB (2012) Emerging techniques to prevent inherited mitochondrial disorders: ethical issues.  
57 NCOB (2012) Novel techniques for the prevention of mitochondrial DNA disorders: an ethical review, at  
www.nuffieldbioethics.org/sites/default/files/Novel_techniques_for_the_prevention_of_mitochondrial_DNA_
disorders_compressed.pdf (last visited 27 July 2013). 
58
 Sciencewise-ERC, the UK’s national centre for public dialogue in policy making involving science and 
technology issues; http://www.sciencewise-erc.org.uk (last visited 27 July 2013). 
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recommendations in support of the use of the technique in March 2013.59 As noted by Dr Geoff 
Watts, Chair of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ Working Party on this issue, the HFEA’s decision to 
licence this technique ‘fuelled’ the pressure on the Government to put regulations before 
Parliament, in order to permit its use in treatment cycles.60 As predicted, in 2013 the Government 
announced its intention to publish draft regulations, to be presented to Parliament in 2014.61 
There is a complex interplay of actors and forces at play in this area which shapes the substantive 
regulation of fertility treatment. Between 1991 (enactment) and the 2008 amendments, most of the 
regulatory changes were made through licensing decisions and developments in the Code of 
Practice.62 Even with Parliamentary scrutiny, the resulting legislation mostly endorsed or ratified the 
standpoints developed earlier by the HFEA. Thus, it codified rather than changed the law and this 
raises questions as to who the law-makers really are in this field; at what points the legislative 
decisions are taken, and how the constitutional legitimacy of the process should be explained. 
 
Legitimation by consultative processes 
The HFEA has recognised the legitimacy problems facing an unelected body making policy under the 
umbrella of its statutory powers and has had to fight a number of cases in the courts where its legal 
authority has been challenged.63 One of the strategies employed to address this concern, as with 
many of the regulatory bodies established to deal with matters of health care law, has been to 
legitimate decisions by preparing for them through public consultation. Thus, the HFEA has 
developed its policies in light of the feedback it gets from the public, although the processes set in 
place to elicit responses are not always optimal.64 Interestingly, with regard to the child welfare 
consultation (explored above), although the HFEA noted that 265 responses were received from 
individuals and organisations, and it provided a breakdown of numbers and percentages as classified 
into ‘patient’, ‘academic’ categories and so on, there is no publicly available data provided on its 
website or in the Report as to how people responded, other than vague statements that ‘some said’, 
‘most argued’ or that views were ‘evenly balanced’. Further, in justifying the paradigm shift in the 
                                                          
59 HFEA, at  www.hfea.gov.uk/6896.html (last visited 27 July 2013). 
60 NCOB, n 57 above, vii.  
61 Press release, ‘Innovative genetic treatment to prevent mitochondrial disease’ 28 June 2013,   
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/innovative-genetic-treatment-to-prevent-mitochondrial-disease (last 
visited 24 July 2013). 
62 Exceptions include the Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001, prohibiting cloning, and provisions regarding 
naming deceased fathers on their children’s birth certificates in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Deceased Fathers) Act 2003; both subsequently incorporated by the HFEA 2008. Both developments were the 
result of judicial review applications, by Pro-Life Alliance in the former and Diane Blood in the latter instance 
(respectively R (on the application of Quintavalle on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) v Secretary of State for Health 
[2001] EWHC Admin 918; and an unreported declaration in the High Court, outlined by Lord Lester HL Deb vol 
650 col 1155-1156 04 July 2003).  
63 R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex p Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687, R (on the app of the 
Assisted Reproduction and Gynaecology Centre and another) v HFEA [2002] EWCA Civ 20,  R (Quintavalle) v 
Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687, Quintavalle v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
[2005] UKHL 28, Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority v Amicus Healthcare Ltd [2005] EWHC 1092 (QB),  
L v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [2008] EWHC 2149 (Fam),     
64
 E. Blyth, M. Crawshaw, L. Frith, C. Jones, N. Martin, ‘No “brownie points” for ill-conceived Donation Review’, 
(2011) Bionews Issue 593, January 31 2011 at www.bionews.org.uk/page_87010.asp (last visited 27 July 2013).   
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interpretation of the meaning of child welfare, reference was made only to ‘the experience of the 
past 14 years’65 and not to specific evidence from the consultation or other relevant research.  
In a separate example, its public consultation on ‘Hybrids and Chimeras’66 involved significant public 
dialogue activities, including deliberative group work in London, Manchester, Newcastle, Belfast, 
Glasgow and Swansea, of which a number of participants attended a subsequent full-day workshop 
with expert speakers present; an opinion poll of 2,000 GB residents and 60 Northern Irish residents; 
and a public meeting, attended by over 150 (self-selected) people. In addition, a written consultation 
and scientific literature review were undertaken, and a small number of stakeholders were 
consulted on specific scientific issues. However, the precise connection between the feedback such 
consultations elicit and the conclusions drawn by the HFEA is not always easy to explain. For 
example, 65 per cent of the 810 written responses to the consultation were against the use of any 
research on human embryos, yet the analysis regarding the possible creation of hybrid, cytoplasmic 
and chimera embryos initially focused on the 35 per cent in favour of such research;67 with 
subsequent reiteration of the finding that the majority of those opposed to the development and 
use of such embryos were also opposed to embryo research in toto.68 Thus, rather than engaging 
further with the potentially interesting differences among the reasons given for these respondents’ 
views (recorded in percentage terms in the final Report), they were placed together in a singular 
category of ‘opposition’, thereby marginalising exploration of the ethical and social reasons provided 
for their views – which at the very least is ironic given the title of the initial consultation (A 
Consultation on the Ethical and Social Implications of Creating Human/Animal Embryos in Research). 
Therefore, while there is an attempt to ensure that the ‘soft law’ that emerges from these processes 
is a matter of co-production with stakeholders, thereby extending considerably the cohort of law-
makers - and potentially assuaging some concerns over the legitimacy of an unelected body driving 
policy in this (sometimes) contentious field - it is not easy to track the dynamics by which some 
views come to hold sway over others.69  
 
Summary 
A substantial body of medical and health care law can now, therefore, make some claim to 
legitimacy through the authority of Parliament. However, the analysis shows an intertwined search 
for both constitutional and democratic legitimacy. The former concerns the proper place of those 
who seem to shape the law within the constitutional structures that confer law-making authority.  It 
is clear that the traditional account of Parliament as the sovereign and sole law-maker, with other 
agencies being subordinate to its authority, needs considerable adaptation if it is adequately to 
capture the processes by which legal rules are created. This extension and delegation of law-making 
powers is not inadvertent, nor is it generally perceived as being a constitutional error (although 
                                                          
65 HFEA, n 35, above, 6.  
66 HFEA, Hybrids and Chimeras A Consultation on the Ethical and Social Implications of Creating Human/Animal 
Embryos in Research, April 2007 at: www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Hybrids_Chimera_review.pdf (last visited 27 July 
2013). 
67 HFEA, n 47 above, especially Appendix D.  
68 For a discussion of similar problems with regard to the Department of Health’s Review of the HFEA 1990, see 
C. Jones, n 18 above.  
69
 For discussion of some early steps in this direction, in the Mental Health Act context, see P. Fennell, 'The 
Mental Health Act Code of Practice' (1990) 53 MLR 499–507 and M. Cavadino, 'Commissions and Codes: A 
Case Study in Law and Public Administration' [1993] PL 333–45. 
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there some hints of this in Parliamentarians’ discussion of the need to take issues back from the 
jurisdiction of the HFEA and possibly in the more general rhetoric of the ‘Bonfire of the Quangos’).70 
Rather, it has become a normal method of making the law, for which we need to be able to give a 
proper constitutional account.  
The response of ‘intermediate law-makers’ to their own anxieties about legitimacy is more 
concerned with democratic legitimacy than legal constitutionalism. The HFEA has been challenged 
on the basis of constitutional powers, but asserting that its decisions are intra vires has not been its 
main legitimation strategy. Rather, that has come from public consultation and engagement. Bodies 
such as the NCOB and the HGC did not have legal constitutions to constrain them, but they also 
showed concern for grounding their recommendations on public opinion. For bodies such as the 
HFEA, the challenge of democratic legitimacy can partly be satisfied by reference back to the 
democratic legitimacy of Parliament, but direct engagement with the public is still carried out. 
Possibly, this is because formal constitutional legitimacy may not be enough, as there is a further set 
of issues about democratic legitimacy that are raised about the enforcement of particular moral 
positions in a pluralist society.71 It would, however, be a good start. 
 
Part 2 Judge-made law and the challenges of legitimation 
Although, as we have shown, Parliamentary authority lies behind a substantial part of medical law, 
judge-made law still dominates some crucial areas, including those concerning the position of 
patients (eg the standard of disclosure required for consent) and also matters of life and death 
(withholding and withdrawing life sustaining treatment). Further, the courts have been the place to 
which professional bodies,72 drug companies,73 campaign groups,74 and individuals,75 have gone to 
test how far the legal rules are consistent with the policy positions that they promote. Hence, 
understanding how the judges react to invitations to make policy in the courts is an important part 
of explaining the ways in which medical and health care law is made. It is necessary, however, to go 
beyond this and to excavate a further set of processes that have remained largely hidden from 
constitutional and jurisprudential concern. Cases do not come before the courts wholly by chance. 
                                                          
70 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Smaller Government: Shrinking the Quango 
State HC  537 (2010-11). 
71
 See J. Montgomery, ‘The Legitimacy of Medical Law’ in In McLean, S (ed) First do no harm: Law, ethics and 
healthcare Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, 1-16. 
72 See eg Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security  [1981] AC 
800 (legality of nurses’ involvement in medical abortions). 
73
 See eg R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p Pfizer [1999] Lloyds Medical Law Reports 289 (QBD) (availability 
of Viagra on the NHS). 
74 See eg British Pregnancy Advisory Service v Secretary of State for Health [2011] EWHC 235 (Admin) (trying to 
force the making of regulations permitting medical abortions at home), R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for 
Health [2003] 2 AC 687 (application of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 to cloning by cell 
nuclear replacement). 
75 See eg Gillick v W Norfolk & Wisbech AHA [1985] 3 All ER 402 and (young people’s access to family planning 
without parental involvement), see also R (On the Application of Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] 
EWHC 37 (Admin), [2006] 1 FCR 175; Jepson v Chief Constable of West Mercia Constabulary [2003] EWHC 3318 
(Admin) (attempt to force the prosecution of doctors who carried out a late termination of pregnancy on the 
basis of bilateral cleft lip and palate).  
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Although the opportunities open to the judiciary to shape the law depend substantially on what 
Munby LJ (as he then was) has described as the ‘happenstance’ of litigation,76 it is not an entirely 
random process.  
Rather, we suggest that there is a ‘typology’ of test cases in the medical and health care law context 
(and indeed more generally),77 which can be illustrated by the development of mental health law in 
England and Wales. That is, some cases are planned as part of a litigation strategy designed to probe 
and change the law. Thus, test case litigation was one of the tools used by Larry Gostin when legal 
director of MIND to establish the ‘ideology of entitlement’78 as a basis for mental health law.79 The 
shape of the Mental Health Act 1983 was in part established by test case litigation before the 
European Court of Human Rights.80 In such cases, the individual dispute can be said to be secondary 
to the issue of principle and it is likely that suitable cases are selected by the sponsors of the 
litigation to maximise the possibility that the case will lead to their preferred result. This selection 
process is rarely transparent and its ability to shape the opportunities presented to judges may be 
significant. 
In contrast to this category, some cases that begin as an attempt to resolve an individual dispute are 
made significant in the development of the law due to the way they are treated by the judges or by 
the interventions made by third parties. The Bournewood81 litigation initially concerned the care 
given to an individual client, but prompted a reassessment of the gap left between mental health 
law and the common law relating to incapacitated patients that is still not fully plugged.82 Following 
the decision of the Court of Appeal, three interested groups who were concerned about the position 
that it created were permitted to become parties.83 Thus, it became a test case only when it looked 
as though the way in which the dispute would be resolved had a wider significance with which policy 
                                                          
76
 Munby LJ, ‘Lost Opportunities: Law Reform and Transparency in the Family Courts’ (2010) CFLQ 22 273-289. 
77 For the purposes of this paper we provide only a brief overview here. The ‘typology’ analysis will be 
developed further in a separate paper.  
78 Eg Collins v The United Kingdom, application no. 9729/82; also, on the right to vote, MIND instigated two 
county court cases, namely Wild and Others v Electoral Registration Officer for Warrington and Another, 
County Court for Warrington, 15 June 1976; Smith and Others v Electoral Registration Officer of Clitheroe 
Constituency, Blackburn County Court, 16 September 1981 – cited in L.O. Gostin, ‘Perspectives on Mental 
Health Reforms’ (1983) 10 J Law & Soc 47, 54 (fn22) and 64 respectively.    
79 L.O. Gostin, A human condition. The Mental Health Act from 1959 to 1975. Observations, analysis and 
proposals for reform (MIND, 1975, volume 1). Also, L.O. Gostin, A Human Condition. The law relating to 
mentally abnormal offenders. Observations, analysis and proposals for reform (MIND, 1977, volume 2). For 
consideration of the assumptions that underpinned this strategy and some of its problems, see N. Rose 
‘Unreasonable Rights: Mental Illness and the Limits of the Law’ (1985) 12 J Law & Soc 199-218. 
80 Eg X v UK (Application 7215/75) (1981) 4 EHRR 188; Ashingdane v UK application no. 8225/78, (1982) 4 EHRR  
590, (1985) 7 EHRR 528. See also Kynaston v UK application no. 9480/81, cited in Gostin (1983, at 63).   
81 R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex p L [1999] AC 458 (HL); HL v UK (also known as 
L v UK) (2005) 40 EHRR 32.  
82 See Pearce J & DJ Jackson, ‘The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards Part 1: has the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
bridged ‘the Bournewood Gap’? [2012] Fam Law 319-322; ‘Part 3: how the authorisation regime safeguards 
are working’ [2012] Fam Law 567-572; ‘Part 6 definition of deprivation of liberty’ [2012] Fam Law 999-1004. 
The continuing availability of the inherent jurisdiction to plug remaining gaps was confirmed in A Local 
Authority v DL [2012] EWCA 253. 
83
 These were the Secretary of State for Health, the Mental Health Act Commission and the Registered Nursing 
Homes Association; R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex p L  [1999] AC 458 (HL), 475 
and 481, [1998] 3 All ER 289, 294. 
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makers were unhappy. Here, interesting issues for ‘hidden lawmaking’ arise around the intervention 
process – that is, the process by which those not originally involved in the dispute become parties or 
make representations before the courts. This includes their decision to seek permission to intervene 
and also the response of the court to whether or not to give such leave. While applications will draw 
attention to this possibility, a decision not to seek to intervene will rarely be visible but may be 
highly significant.  
In a third category, test case status can be accrued in the course of legal history by subsequent 
reflection on decisions. Thus, Re C84 established the common law test for capacity and prompted its 
consolidation into what is now the statutory test under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (via the work 
of the Law Commission, cited above), but was not seen at the time by the lawyers involved as an 
especially novel case.85 In a different area of law, R v Adams was a celebrated murder trial but few 
can have predicted that a jury direction from a puisne judge (which was never properly reported) 
would provide the leading legal authority on medical euthanasia over half a century later.86 The 
judge’s own account of the case concentrates on issues of evidence and the approaches taken by the 
police and lawyers.87 One leading academic text of the time saw the direction as using the concept of 
causation when ‘necessity’ would capture the issues better and does not give it any priority over 
other approaches.88 Another does not even refer to it in its account of recent mercy killing cases.89 
The legal sections of the contributions from the Church of England to the euthanasia debates in the 
1960s and 1970s cover the issues but do not rely on the Adams case as authority.90 In 1988, the 
British Medical Association regarded the issues as unclear but by 1992 it was relying on Adams.91 In 
the first edition of Mason and McCall Smith’s textbook on Law and Medical Ethics, published in 
1983, there is a brief mention of the case as an  example of ‘double effect’.92 By the second, only 
four years later, it has come to be described as ‘the seminal case in the United Kingdom’.93 In the 
House of Lords in Bland Lord Goff regarded the rule as ‘established’.94 However, it is far from clear 
by whom it was established and by what authority. In R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice it was 
regarded as an accepted legal principle, although it was noted that it has ‘nowhere been the subject 
of a specific decision but seems to have been generally assumed to be the law by criminal 
                                                          
84 Re C (Adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819.  
85 Andrew Grubb saw the test as a development of those set out in Gillick, and the Mental Health Act 1983; 
(1994) 2(1) Med L Rev 92-95. 
86
  H. Palmer, ‘Adam’s Trial for Murder’ [1957] Crim LR 365.  
87 P. Devlin, Easing the Passing: The Trial of Dr John Bodkin Adams (Bodley Head, 1985). 
88 G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (Faber & Faber, 1958) 283-291. 
89 N. St John Stevas, Life Death and the Law (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1961) 263-4. 
90
 Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility, Decisions about Life and Death: A problem in modern 
medicine (Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, 1965) Appendix 2, by Chancellor E. Garth Moore. 
General Synod Board for Social Responsibility, On Dying Well: An Anglican contribution to the debate on 
euthanasia (Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, 1975) chapter 6, drafting led by Chancellor E. 
Garth Moore. In the second edition (Church House Publishing 2000), Adams is relied upon as the principal 
authority (drafted by Jonathan Montgomery). 
91 Compare BMA, Euthanasia (BMA 1988) para 257-60 with BMA, Rights and Responsibilities of Doctors (2nd Ed 
BMA 1992) 76-77. The first edition of the latter book does not address the area. 
92
 J.K. Mason & R.A. McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics (Butterworths, 1983) 182-3. 
93
 J.K. Mason & R.A. McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics (2
nd
 Ed Butterworths, 1987) 238. 
94
 See Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821, 868. 
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practitioners.’95 This is a process of law-making that begins and ends in judicial pronouncements, but 
whose intermediate steps remain extremely opaque. 
A fuller understanding of the processes by which litigation emerges from amongst the various 
options for progressing disputes and campaigns for law reform will illuminate some key questions 
about test case litigation in the light of unequal access to justice.  Our focus in this paper is on the 
‘personnel’ aspect of hidden law-making: who is making law and how far is it beyond their explicit 
mandate to do so? While it is clear that alternative pressures and dynamics generated in and by the 
legal system itself will also prove influential - determining which cases might be brought, who has 
standing, funding and the like – these elements fall outside the focus of this article and will need to 
be explored elsewhere.  
 
Judges: reluctant law-makers? 
A broadly accepted account of both why judges have been generally sensitive to the higher authority 
of the legislature on policy matters, and also the difficulties of relying on case law as a source of legal 
development was expressed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the Bland case: 
The position therefore, in my view, is that if the judges seek to develop new law to regulate 
the new circumstances, the law so laid down will of necessity reflect judges' views on the 
underlying ethical questions… 
Where a case raises wholly new moral and social issues, in my judgment it is not for the 
judges to seek to develop new, all embracing, principles of law in a way which reflects the 
individual judges' moral stance when society as a whole is substantially divided on the 
relevant moral issues. Moreover, it is not legitimate for a judge in reaching a view as to what 
is for the benefit of the one individual whose life is in issue to take into account the wider 
practical issues as to allocation of limited financial resources or the impact on third parties of 
altering the time at which death occurs. 
For these reasons, it seems to me imperative that the moral, social and legal issues raised by 
this case should be considered by Parliament. The judges' function in this area of the law 
should be to apply the principles which society, through the democratic process, adopts, not 
to impose their standards on society. If Parliament fails to act, then judge-made law will of 
necessity through a gradual and uncertain process provide a legal answer to each new 
question as it arises. But in my judgment that is not the best way to proceed.96 
In many respects, this expression of reticence articulates the Hartian concerns that judicial activism 
is based on personal rather than legal values and therefore legislation rather than adjudication. It 
also reflects concern that the courts do not have the full range of information that is relevant to 
determining policy before them. These anxieties were described in the High Court in  R (Nicklinson) v 
Ministry of Justice, as issues of ‘competence’ (indicating wariness of determining conflicts of 
fundamental principles through specific cases), ‘constitutionality’ (deference to Parliamentary 
                                                          
95
 [2013] EWCA 961 at [26]. 
96
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 FLR 1026, 1051, emphasis added. 
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sovereignty) and ‘control of the circumstances’ (the need for safeguards to be put in place rather 
than a general permission).97  Approving this analysis, the Court of Appeal said:  
Parliament as the conscience of the nation is the appropriate constitutional forum, not 
judges who might be influenced by their own particular moral perspectives; the judicial 
process which has to focus on the particular facts and circumstances before the court is not 
one which is suited to enabling the judges to deal competently with the range of conflicting 
considerations and procedural requirements which a proper regulation of the field may 
require; and there is a danger that any particular judicial decision, influenced perhaps by 
particular sympathy for an individual claimant, may have unforeseen consequences, creating 
an unfortunate precedent binding in other contexts.98 
However, the suggestion that judicial law-making may be reluctantly undertaken as a matter of 
necessity obscures the extent to which the judiciary has, in fact, taken the initiative in the 
development of legal rules. We would posit that judges are less reluctant to get involved in law-
making than this account would suggest. 
Judges certainly exercise more discretion over the way in which they develop the law than Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson’s statement implies. They can choose to deal with issues narrowly (dealing only 
with what is required to resolve the immediate dispute) or expansively (to contribute to the 
development of legal principles). This can be illustrated by reference to two controversial Court of 
Appeal decisions regarding adolescents who refused medical treatment.99 In each case the court 
could have disposed of the issue on the narrow ground that the young women in question lacked the 
necessary degree of understanding to pass the legal test of competence.100 That would have enabled 
those with parental responsibility to consent to the treatment, in their best interests. However, in 
both cases the judges went further and also noted that, even if the young women had been 
competent to give or withhold consent to the treatment, their competence would not have excluded 
the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts to act in their best interests, even when that meant 
overriding their choices. If, on the facts this step was, strictly speaking, unnecessary, there was even 
less need to go further still and consider whether the consent of a person with parental 
responsibility would remain valid if the young women had been deemed ‘Gillick competent’ – 
although it could be seen as giving a clear signal against further appeal by showing that the outcome 
of the case was unlikely to be changed. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal did take this additional 
step, and in the second case Lord Donaldson expressed some irritation with commentators who had 
taken exception to the position that he had outlined in the earlier decision, making clear that he 
regarded it as an integral part of his reasoning that should not be marginalised in subsequent 
cases.101   
A further example of the scope for a very different approach to the role of judges can be seen in the 
judgments in three cases concerning whether the ‘morning after pill’ should be classified as an 
                                                          
97 [2012] EWHC 2381 (Admin) at [75-87].  
98 R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA 961 at [60]. See also the trenchant comments on 
constitutionality from Judge CJ at [153-6] (which could possibly also be addressed to the approach of the 
House of Lords in Purdy). 
99 Re R [1991] 4 All ER 177; Re W (1992) BMLR 22. 
100
 As set out in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1985] 3 All ER 402, discussed below. 
101
 Re W (1992) 9 BMLR 22, [1992] 2 FCR 785, 798. Arguably it was quietly ignored in R (On the Application of 
Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin), [2006] 1 FCR 175. 
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abortifacient under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (and therefore only to be used within 
the provisions of Abortion Act 1967, which required certification by two doctors that the grounds 
were made out). In the first two decisions, the judges were content to give brief judgments citing the 
usage of common language and the assumptions of prevailing medical practice.102 Yet, in R 
(Smeaton) v Secretary of State for Health a very different approach was adopted by Munby J (as he 
then was).103 His judgment ran to 398 paragraphs and included a discussion of the theory of 
statutory interpretation, a full review of the Nineteenth Century medical literature (to aid 
understanding of the use of language when Parliament had passed the original legislation), and 
examination of the relevant academic legal writings. This is different both to the pragmatism of the 
two earlier decisions, but also to the more flexible ‘purposive’ approach to statutory interpretation 
adopted by the House of Lords latterly in determining the application of legislation in the light of 
scientific advances.104 
The decisions taken by these different judges on how to approach cases seem to be driven by some 
deeper assumptions regarding the purpose of medical law. Thus, Lord Donaldson was concerned to 
ensure that the law did not intrude unduly into medical practice, stating his satisfaction with the 
result of his approach, that the ‘doctor will be presented with a professional and ethical but not a 
legal problem.’105  In contrast, the approach taken by Munby LJ seems to be built on the view that 
legal scrutiny should be increased,106 although in two later cases, the Court of Appeal indicated 
concern about the approach which he had taken.107 These examples illustrate very different 
approaches to the responsibilities of judges, and also to the fundamental structure of medical and 
health care law.108 The choice between them has fundamental implications for the future of the law, 
but the basis on which they are to be made is obscured by the traditional view that judges follow 
rather than make the law. 
This judicial creativity is not, however, merely reactive to cases put before them. In the Bland case, 
the House of Lords endorsed the suggestion of the (then) President of the Family Division (Sir 
Stephen Brown) that cases of patients in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) should be brought to 
court for consideration prior to the withdrawal of treatment.109 The reasons given for this 
                                                          
102 R v Price [1969] 1 QB 541, R v Dhingra (1991, unreported, Birmingham Crown Court). 
103 [2002] 2 FCR 193. See for discussion, J. Keown, ‘”Morning after” pills, “miscarriage” and muddle’ (2005) 
25(2) LS 296-319. 
104 R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687. See also Quintavalle v Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority [2005] UKHL 28 on a different aspect of the same statute. It should also be noted 
that, prior to the Smeaton case, this was an area where a politico-legal consensus had led people to operate as 
if an authoritative ruling had been made. The Attorney General, Michael Havers, had made a statement to the 
House of Commons that the Abortion Act 1967 only applied post-implantation in answer to a Parliamentary 
Question on 10 May 1983, Hansard HC Vol 42 Cols 238-9 which had been widely regarded as settling the 
matter for practical purposes. 
105 Re R [1991] 4 All ER 177, 185. 
106 See in addition to R (Smeaton), above, R (Watts) v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for 
Health [2003] EWHC 2228 (Admin), [2004] Lloyd’s Rep Med 113 and R (Burke) v GMC [2004] EWHC 1879 
(Admin), [2004] 2 FLR 1121.  
107 See R (Watts) v Secretary of State for Health [2004] EWCA Civ 166, (2004) 77 BMLR 26 and R (Burke) v 
General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003, [2005] 2 FLR 1223. 
108 See J. Montgomery, ‘Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26(2) LS 185-210, especially 202-205 
for discussion. 
109
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 FLR 1026, see for example, comments by Lord Keith at 856, and Lord 
Goff at 873-874, affirming the views of Sir Bingham MR at 815-816, and Butler-Sloss LJ at 824 (albeit Lord Goff 
Hidden lawmaking in the province of medical jurisprudence 
(2014) 77(3) MLR 343-378 – Accepted Version 
 
 19 
requirement were that the nature of PVS was uncertain, and that there was therefore scope for 
disagreement amongst relatives and professional staff. Here, the judges seem to be promoting 
further litigation in order to give them the opportunity to develop legal principles. Thus, the picture 
is more complex than Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s statement of deference to Parliamentary sovereignty 
would imply. There are also cases where the judges express the view that litigation was 
inappropriate; either by passing comment on the wisdom of the case being brought,110or more 
harshly in awarding costs against a hospital that seemed reluctant to accept the legal position on the 
treatment of adolescents that had been established by the Court of Appeal.111 Hence, the judges 
seem here to be taking steps to manage the production of law reform (or discourage it) through the 
courts. 
A particularly stark example of the judges prompting changes in the law without reference to 
Parliament can be seen in the finding of the House of Lords in the Purdy case that the provisions of 
the ECHR required greater clarity on the prosecution policy adopted in relation to the crime of 
assisting a suicide.112 Although the point had not been raised in, or by, earlier litigation on the 
implications of Article 8 of the ECHR for assisted dying,113 their Lordships regarded the current state 
of English law to be too imprecise to meet the requirement that interventions into private and 
family life needed to be ‘in accordance with the law’ before they could be compatible with the ECHR. 
They therefore prompted the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to promulgate a detailed policy 
on the factors that will be taken into account in such cases.114 In a wider context, this raises 
challenging constitutional issues not least as, in the same month as the Purdy case was heard in the 
House of Lords, Parliament had expressly considered and rejected reform in the precise area of law 
with which the litigation was concerned. Their Lordships’ approach could therefore be seen as an 
affront to Parliamentary sovereignty.115  
In relation to ‘hidden lawmaking’, however, the main interest lies in the role of the DPP, who was 
given responsibility for developing the new ‘law’. His guidelines for prosecution play an important 
part in shaping the legal rules as they operate in practice, but this role is poorly accounted for in 
constitutional accounts of how law is made. In a strong dissent in R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice, 
Judge CJ drew attention to the way in which ‘the process of necessary law reform has been 
subsumed in prosecutorial guidance.  In short, prosecutorial guidance is in danger of expanding into 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
indicated his hope that the President of the Family Division might, in future, relax this requirement and limit it 
to those cases where a ‘special need’ for the procedure was present). 
110
 See the comments in R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003, [2005] 2 FLR 1223, eg per 
Lord Phillips at [13-14], [19], [21], [82]. See further below.  
111 Northamptonshire HA v Official Solicitor and Governors of St Andrew's Hospital [1994] 1 FLR 162. Similarly, 
in the context of advance directions, see Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam), per Dame 
Butler-Sloss at [99]. 
112 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45, see Lord Phillips at [16]; Lord Hope at [56]; Baroness Hale at [86-87], and 
Lord Neuberger at [101]. 
113 Pretty v UK [2002] 2 FCR 97. 
114
 For a discussion of this policy, the consultation and some of its flaws, see P. Lewis ‘Informal legal change on 
assisted suicide: the policy for prosecutors’ (2010) LS 31(1) 119-134.  
115
 See J. Montgomery, ‘Guarding the gates of St Peter: life, death and law making’ (2011) LS 31(4), 644-666.  
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a method of law reform (if only by way of non-enforcement of the criminal law) which is outside the 
proper ambit of the DPP’s responsibilities.’116 
Nonetheless, we have already seen that ‘soft’ law instruments, such as codes of practice and 
guidance notes have played a significant role in the making of medical and health care law. They 
have been incorporated into judicial decisions, as in the use of medical guidance on the 
management of PVS cases in Bland,117 and have also been mandated by Parliament as a means to 
translate legal provisions into practice guidance.118 This area of law thus relies heavily on a body of 
‘law-makers’ who sit neither in the legislature nor the judiciary, but whose existence is recognised in 
the process by which legal norms are formed. 
 
Deliberative engagement 
Statutory bodies such as the HFEA are not the only organisations that seek legitimacy in deliberative 
engagement. The process adopted by the DPP to develop his policy for prosecutors119 following the 
Purdy case was an open one. It involved the publication of a consultation document (also serving as 
an interim policy), consideration of responses, and then the issue of a final policy, which included 16 
factors that tend in favour of prosecution and six against.  More factors were included in the interim 
policy, but those relating to the medical condition and perceived vulnerability of the assisted person 
(termed the ‘victim’ in the policy) were removed after the consultation.  
The published policy insists that the law has not changed and assisting or encouraging the suicide of 
another continues to be a criminal offence that is open to prosecution.120 Yet, as Mullock points out, 
this may not be entirely true, as the policy has ‘the effect of sanctioning compassionately motivated 
assisted suicide, with compassion as the key determining factor which potentially places an act 
which remains criminal beyond the reach of the criminal courts.’121 Further, some commentators 
regard the process by which the policy was developed as unconstitutional, even dangerous.122 The 
fact that the DPP was required by the judiciary to develop the prosecutorial policy in order to 
provide clarity is in itself somewhat unusual.123 Consequently, it is perhaps not the policy itself that 
should be criticised but rather the questionable processes which led to the ruling in Purdy.  
Since the first reported case in 2003124 there have been many instances of British nationals being 
helped to travel to the Dignitas clinic in Zurich for an assisted suicide. In R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of 
                                                          
116
 [2013] EWCA Civ 961 at [169], considering wider developments in prosecution guidelines to draw attention 
to the dangers he saw in the Nicklinson and Purdy cases. 
117 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 FLR 1026. 
118 See for example the role of Codes of Practice under the Mental Health Act 1983, the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990, the Human Tissue Act 2004 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005.  
119 CPS, Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide at 
www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html (last visited 29 July 2013). 
120 ibid at para 6. 
121 A. Mullock, ‘Overlooking the Criminally Compassionate: What are the implications of prosecutorial policy on 
encouraging or assisting suicide?’ (2010) Med Law Rev 18(4) 442-470. 
122 For example, J. Keown, ‘Dangerous Guidance’ (2009) 159 New Law Journal 1718. 
123 Although not unique, as discussed by Judge CJ in his dissenting judgment in R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of 
Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 961 at [168]. 
124
 BBC News, 24
th
 January 2003, ‘Suicide man's 'dignified' death’ 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/2688843.stm (last visited 29 July 2013). See also H. Biggs and C. Jones, 
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Justice, the court was told that approximately 25 British citizens had travelled each year between 
2008 and 2010 to make use of its services.125 Nobody has been prosecuted, partly because of 
decisions taken in the office of the DPP that prosecution would not be in the public interest.126 
Whilst it has always been the case that prosecution requires the consent of the DPP,127 this 
seemingly systematic approach to a particular crime smacks of a normative response. The judgment 
in Purdy represents clear evidence that the court saw it in this light, with Lord Brown accepting 
previous prosecutorial reluctance to prosecute as ‘sensitive, thoughtful and principled’,128 and  
calling for a ‘custom built policy statement indicating the various factors for and against prosecution 
… designed to distinguish between those situations in which, however tempted to assist, the 
prospective aider and abetter should refrain from doing so, and those situations in which he or she 
may be, … forgiven rather than condemned’.129  
Nowhere within this statement, or anywhere in the Purdy judgment, are concerns expressed about 
the potential to undermine the independence of the office of the DPP by requiring the publication of 
such a policy even though it was premised upon the notion that it is legitimate, in some 
circumstances, not to prosecute those who assist suicide. Nevertheless, alongside the extensive 
public consultation, the intervention of the Law Lords does lend legitimacy to the policy making 
process. It certainly renders visible a process that might otherwise be obscured. This may, however, 
be at the expense of constitutional theory about the separation of powers.  In R (Nicklinson) v 
Ministry of Justice, the Court of Appeal held that further clarity was still required, but did recognise 
that there was a constitutional issue to be considered. The Lord Chief Justice dissented precisely on 
the point that the DPP was being asked to do something that was constitutionally inappropriate.130 It 
is expected that the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to consider this issue. 
 
Litigation and obscured law-making 
In one sense the leading players in test cases are highly visible. The parties are identified in the law 
reports along with the judges, counsel and solicitors. However, there are a number of senses in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Tourism: A Matter of Life and Death in the United Kingdom’ in I. G. Cohen (ed), The Globalization of Health 
Care (New York: OUP, 2013). 
125 [2013] EWCA Civ 961 at [129]. 
126
 The DPP considered such 8 cases in the ten years up to 2008, a small proportion of those thought to have 
travelled to Switzerland, of which none were prosecuted (mostly because of evidential problems); see  
http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_keyfacts.html (last visited 1 August 2013). Since the Purdy decision 
the DPP has published reasons for five non-prosecution decisions taken in 2010, involving seven defendants. In 
respect of three of those defendants the non-prosecution was because of insufficient evidence. In respect of 
the other four it was based on public interest considerations; see DPP, ‘Assisted Suicide cases - published 
decisions’ at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide.html (last visited 1 August 
2013). Latest figures are reported on this webpage and updated every six months. From 1st April 2009 up to 1 
March 2013 there were 68 cases referred to the CPS by the police, 7 of which were still under investigation, 
Only two charges are being brought, which were for murder or manslaughter rather than assisted suicide.  
127 Suicide Act 1961, s 2(4).  
128 R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 44 at [81]. 
129
 R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 44 at [86]. 
130
 See the concerns expressed by Judge CJ in his dissenting judgment in R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice 
[2013] EWCA Civ 961. 
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which the law-making process is obscured by the apparent transparency of the record that is set out 
in the decisions of the courts.   
Legal personnel – concentration of expertise 
Some of these relate to the personnel of the law, where there are patterns that need to be 
recognised as influencing the development of the substantive law. Thus, where there has been a 
tendency to instruct the same specialist barristers, known to be supportive of particular views, this 
can lead to a consistent approach to advice and argument.  Similarly, there are patterns of solicitors 
specialising in certain types of cases. These processes of concentrating the preparation of litigation 
on a limited group of lawyers can also be seen as a form of law-making in the shadow of the court 
process (and therefore drawing its legitimacy from the adjudication in the case), but it is a process 
that is not necessarily explicitly validated by the judges (not least, because it may be hidden from 
them). The role of lawyers beyond the judiciary therefore requires further consideration.  
In some areas, this can be seen quite easily. The fact that medical law cases have frequently involved 
vulnerable and incapacitated persons has meant that the Official Solicitor has often been involved in 
the key cases, and has played a consequential role in codifying practice, and to some extent thereby 
codifying the substantive law too. Practice Notes indicating the understanding that the Official 
Solicitor has reached of the implications of judicial decisions serve the function of drawing together 
the disparate comments of judges into a coherent guide to practice. This was done in relation to the 
string of decisions exploring the sterilisation of incapacitated women and the withdrawal of life 
sustaining treatment from those in a vegetative state, initially as separate notes which were 
subsequently codified into a single note covering those unable to consent for themselves.131  Under 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005, this role has become a more formal one, and moved into the 
jurisdiction of a recognised legal authority, through the issue of Practice Directions by the President 
of the Court of Protection, supplementary to the Court of Protection Rules 2007.132 The initial foray 
of the Official Solicitor in this quasi-legislative role in medical law was made in response to the 
decision of the House of Lords in F v West Berkshire Health Authority.133 In subsequent litigation, 
Thorpe J (as he then was) raised some concerns about its content, observing that it was ‘issued for 
the guidance of practitioners and was not intended to be a mandatory code’, and suggesting various 
points at which it failed to reflect the position as he saw it.134 As he recognised, advice from the 
Official Solicitor has a more significant impact on the conduct of the litigation than the personal 
opinion of a lawyer, and commands a degree of informal authority that is properly seen as a form of 
law-making. 
One of the interesting consequences of the consistent involvement of the Official Solicitor is that it 
led to a tendency to instruct the same counsel. Thus, Allan Levy and James Munby were regularly 
instructed in the major medical law cases of the 1980s and had an opportunity to develop their own 
                                                          
131 Practice Note (Official Solicitor: Sterilisation) [1989] 2 FLR 447, amended [1990] 2 FLR 530,  Practice Note 
(Sterilisation: Minors and mental health patients) [1993] 3 All ER 222 and Practice Note (persistent vegetative 
state: Withdrawal of treatment) [1994] 2 All ER 413, then Practice Note: Official Solicitor: Sterilisation [1996] 2 
FLR 111, Practice Note (Vegetative State) [1996] 2 FLR 375, and subsequently Practice Note (Official Solicitor: 
Declaratory Proceedings: Medical and Welfare Decisions for Adults Who Lack Capacity) [2001] 2 FLR 158. 
132 SI 2007 No. 1744, see Practice Direction 9E – Applications Relating to Serious Medical Treatment at  
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/practice-directions/cop-practice-directions (last visited 
5 August 2013).  
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thinking and regular lines of argument. The latter argued as counsel that treatment should not be 
withdrawn or withheld from children unless their lives were ‘’so full of pain and suffering’ as to be 
‘intolerable’ and so ‘demonstrably awful’ that the child must be ‘condemned to die’. However, this 
suggestion was rejected by the courts in favour of an undifferentiated welfare test.135 This did not 
stop Munby J (as he had then become) adopting the same approach on the bench in the Burke 
case.136 The Court of Appeal overturned his decision and was specifically critical of his suggestion 
that intolerability was a legal test,137 a position it confirmed in its decision in the Wyatt litigation.138 
Nevertheless, the debate has continued. One Court of Appeal judge has suggested that it is open to 
a Court of Protection judge to have regard to whether life is ‘tolerable’ in the best interests 
assessment,139 but most judges have avoided it as unhelpful.140 
A brief analysis of Munby J’s (as he then was) reasoning in Burke is nevertheless instructive. It shows 
the continuity between his work as counsel and later judicial rulings, indicating that the process of 
law-making has roots outside of individual case decisions, which need to be brought into detailed 
consideration. It also illustrates the relative invisibility of this history to all but the most informed 
student of this area of law.  The argument’s legal pedigree ranged through a series of cases; Bland 141 
(counsel Munby QC alongside Robert Francis QC acting for the Health Authority, and who was also 
counsel in Burke), Re J142 (counsel Munby QC), the ‘classic case’ of Re B143 (counsel Munby QC), Re 
C144 (counsel Munby QC), Re R145 (counsel Munby QC), and NHS Trust v D.146 This might be said to be 
a selective history of welfare cases, and it could also be argued that Munby J’s treatment of Taylor 
LJ’s judgment in Re J as the dominant one is less common than taking Lord Donaldson’s as the 
leading judgment. However, this is apparent on the face of his argument and open to scrutiny and 
challenge (as indeed it was scrutinised and challenged before the Court of Appeal). Slightly more 
obscurely, in his judgment Munby J notes the analysis set out in the relevant sections of the 
standard practitioner text, Kennedy and Grubb’s Principles of Medical Law.147 Few readers were 
likely to appreciate that these were in fact sections that he had authored himself. Munby J therefore 
offered what seems like an account of cumulative and independent authority for his interpretation 
of the welfare principle that in fact was the repetition of a case that he had personally been 
promoting over a long period. This neither enhances not decreases the validity of his position, but it 
is not quite the simple story of a developing line of authority that it might seem to be to a reader 
who was ignorant of this history. It suggests that a comprehensive account of how the law is being 
                                                          
135 Re J [1990] 3 All ER 930. 
136 R (Burke) v GMC [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin) at [98-113]. 
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 R (Burke) v GMC [2005] EWCA Civ 1003 at [62-3]. 
138 Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt [2005] EWCA Civ 1181 at [58-91], see most explicitly [62]. 
139 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] EWCA Civ 65, at [49] (Sir Alan Ward). 
140 E.g. Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt [2004] EWHC 2247 (Fam) (Hedley J); Re L (A Child) (Medical Treatment: 
Benefit) [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam) (Butler-Sloss P); NHS Trust v D [2005] EWHC 2439 (Fam) (Coleridge J);   NHS 
Trust v MB [2006] EWHC 507 (Fam) (Holman J); Re K (A Child) (Medical Treatment: Declaration) [2006] EWHC 
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 Burke, n 136 above, at [104], I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, Principles of Medical Law (Oxford: OUP, 2
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 ed, 
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made would need to have regard to his personal contribution prior to being appointed to the bench 
and in his extra-judicial writings. 
This pattern of developing expertise around a small number of legal practitioners can also be seen at 
work in a campaigning context in the contribution of Gerard Wright QC, who acted in a number of 
significant cases promoting views consistent with the Roman Catholic faith. He appeared for Mrs 
Gillick in all levels of her litigation, a case in which the DHSS did not instruct silks.148 Similarly, he 
appeared in all levels of the Janaway case, in which a secretary sought to use the conscience clause 
to avoid typing correspondence connected with the arrangements of terminations149; and 
represented an Oxford student who sought to intervene to prevent his former girlfriend terminating 
her pregnancy, instructed by the same firm of solicitors as in Janaway.150  Further, he published on 
medico-legal matters from a Roman Catholic perspective, providing counsel’s opinion on the legal 
status of the IVF embryo for the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child as part of its 
submission to the Warnock Inquiry,151 and giving a talk on his concerns over legal aspects of dying to 
a symposium of the Guild of Catholic Doctors.152 It seems clear that some legal practitioners have 
more influence on how law develops than others, and that this is an area for further study. 
 
Parties 
A second sense in which the lawmaking processes are obscured concerns the parties to litigation. In 
some cases disputes seem to be concerned solely with the issues affecting individuals, in others the 
parties seem to represent particular moral positions. We showed above that some cases only 
emerge as significant through their subsequent interpretation, In those cases, the parties involved 
play little part in their cases becoming an important event in the making of the law. However, where 
cases are planned as ‘test-cases’ or become such cases through the intervention of third parties, it is 
important to consider how to assess the legitimacy of their actions in bringing matters to court. It 
may be idea that this does not cause constitutional anxieties because the judges provide legitimacy 
for the law-making consequences of test-cases. However, this is an area that deserves some 
consideration.  
Bob Lee and Derek Morgan developed the idea of a ‘stigmata’ case to capture the way in which  
some litigation raises questions that require the courts ‘to develop a social, even a moral vision with 
which to respond to the dilemmas created by the social and cultural revolution of contemporary 
medicine’.153 In their first discussion of this idea, they focused on two cases that have the 
                                                          
148 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1984] QB 581 (QBD), [1985] 1 All ER 533 (CA), [1985] 3 All ER 402 
(HL). 
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 R (Janaway) v Salford AHA 1988] 1 FLR 17 (QBD), [1988] 2 FLR 370 (CA), [1988] UKHL 17, [1989] AC 537 (HL). 
150 C v S [1987] 1 All ER 1230. 
151 Gerard Wright QC, ‘Legal Status of the IVF Embryo: Counsel’s Opinion’ in J. Lejeune, P. Ramsey & G Wright, 
The Question of In Vitro Fertilization: Studies in Medicine, Law and Ethics (London, SPUC Education Trust 1984) 
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(London, Unity Press, 2nd ed 1985). 
152 Gerard Wright QC, ‘The Culture of Death’  Talk given at the Symposium of the Guild of Catholic Doctors, 
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characteristics that they describe but which began as highly personal legal problems. 154 In Airedale 
NHS Trust v Bland the matter became a legal problem because the treating consultant had been 
warned by the local coroner that withholding treatment from his patient could expose him to risk of 
prosecution for murder.155 Consequently, he brought the matter to court in order to ensure that his 
legal position was clear. In the litigation brought by Diane Blood, she was seeking the opportunity to 
have a child by her deceased husband, a campaign that took her court twice and then to Parliament 
to secure recognition for the child’s status.156 While these cases have proved to be important for the 
development of the law, they appear to have been prompted by personal tragedies rather than a 
campaigning desire to change the rules. 
In other cases, it has been clear from the outset that the issues have a broader significance than the 
immediate dispute.  When Mrs Victoria Gillick brought her case about family planning advice for 
young people, it was expressly stated that the issue was hypothetical and that there was no 
suggestion that her daughters were actually seeking such advice at the time.157 Few doubted that 
the principal reason for bringing the case was to establish the principle of parental control over their 
children’s upbringing prompted by Mrs Gillick’s views on family life, drawn from her faith as a 
Roman Catholic. In subsequent litigation, she sought to protect her reputation in further 
campaigning activities.158  
In many cases, the motivation of a litigant is unclear, but there is occasional judicial disapproval of 
the use of the courts for campaigning without a pressing personal interest. Thus, Lord Phillips MR 
stated:  
Had Mr Burke been well advised he would and could have sought reassurance from the 
GMC as to the purport of their guidelines and from the doctors who were treating him as to 
the circumstances, if any, in which ANH might be discontinued.  Mr Burke did not take that 
course. The manner and circumstances in which these proceedings were commenced 
suggest that he was persuaded to advance a claim for judicial review by persons who wished 
to challenge aspects of the GMC guidance which had no relevance to a man in Mr Burke's 
position.159  
Implicit in this comment is disquiet about the use of the law in this way, prompting consideration of 
whether there are some criteria (beyond the formal rules about standing) against which it is possible 
to judge the propriety of litigants raising general issues through the courts. This can be seen as a 
recognition of the need to legitimise this, currently obscured, aspect of law-making through test case 
litigation. 
                                                          
154 D. Morgan & R. G. Lee, ‘In the Name of the Father? Ex p Blood: Dealing with Novelty and Anomaly’ (1997) 
60 MLR 840-856. 
155 [1993] 1 FLR 1026. 
156 R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex p Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687. The second case is 
unreported, but see D. Blood, Flesh and Blood: The Human Story Behind the Headlines (Edinburgh: Mainstream 
Publishing, 2004), 263-264, 273-274, 279-281, 288-293. The legislation was the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act 2003, whose provisions were incorporated into the Human and 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. 
157 Gillick v W Norfolk & Wisbech AHA [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
158
 Gillick v BBC (1996) EMLR 267 (in which Mrs Gillick succeeded); Gillick v Brook Advisory Centres [2002] 
EWHC 829 (QB) (in which Mrs Gillick lost). 
159
 R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003, at para [13]-[14], emphasis added. 
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If the characters and circumstances of the individuals involved in cases have an impact on the way in 
which the substantive law develops, then test case litigation, in its various senses, is not entirely 
random. Further work is necessary to trace the patterns and consider their implications. One of 
those patterns concerns how test case litigation is connected to other efforts to promote reform of 
the law. 
 
Litigation and the politics of campaigning 
Two recent examples of test case litigation provide instructive examples. In both cases it is possible 
to see where the court cases come in the sequence of legal steps and allow discussion of how far 
such cases reinforce the orthodox expectations of the separation of powers doctrine, or whether 
they require some further revision of the traditional judicial account of deference to Parliament 
while subjecting the Executive to the Rule of Law. In the first example, concerning the Abortion Act 
1967, litigation was a step taken after other attempts to get the legal issues examined had failed. It 
could plausibly be described as a step of last resort. The second example, around death and dying, 
shows a more complex interplay between courts and Parliament. 
In February 2011, Supperstone J ruled in a case brought by British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS) 
for a declaration on the meaning of the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967 relating to where 
abortions could take place.160 The case concerned ‘medical’ abortions, where the woman’s 
miscarriage is caused by a drug and in particular early medical abortions where miscarriage takes 
place in the first nine weeks of the pregnancy. There are safeguards in the Act that require 
pregnancies to the ‘terminated’ by a registered medical practitioner in an approved place.161 These 
make sense in relation to surgical abortions, but seem less clearly logical in relation to medical 
abortions. The court was told it was possible for women to take the drugs and then return home, 
expecting to have the miscarriage there but risking it occurring while they were travelling.162 BPAS 
contended that it would be preferable if women were able to obtain the drug from their doctor and 
self-administer it at home and that the legislation permitted this because the phrase ‘treatment for 
the termination of pregnancy’ in section 1(3) of the Act, which could only lawfully occur in an 
‘approved place’, covered the act of prescription not administration.163 The court did not accept that 
construction and held that the course of action that terminated the pregnancy, both the prescription 
and administration had to be in a place approved by the Secretary of State.  
If the dynamic of policy development is to be understood, it is important to place this case in a 
broader context. Litigation was not the preferred route for BPAS.164 Rather, it followed a prolonged 
series of attempts to raise the policy issue for decision. Discussions between BPAS and the 
                                                          
160
 BPAS v Sec State for Health [2011] EWHC 235 (Admin). 
161 Abortion Act 1967, s 1(3), (3A). 
162 At [10-11] of the judgment. 
163 It is important to distinguish the provisions relating to the place of termination from the question whether 
the termination in question was carried out by a doctor under s 1(1) so that the defence against the 1861 Act 
was available. In RCN v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] AC 801 it had been established that 
the administration of the drugs by a nurse was acceptable providing it was under the authority of a doctor. 
Similarly, self-administration could be under the authority of the doctor for the purposes of s 1(1). However, 
the RCN case concerned medical abortions in hospital and did not therefore address the scope of s 1(3).  
164
 This summary of the background, as seen by BPAS, is based on a presentation by Dorothy Flower to the 
Modern Law Review Seminar, ‘Hidden Law-makers’ held at the University of Southampton in May 2011.  
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Department of Health had been initiated in 2000, but had not led to any resolution. An attempt had 
been made secure Parliamentary consideration when, in 2007, BPAS, along with a number of other 
groups pushing for reform of the law (on all sides of the policy debates) sought to raise the matter 
within the review of the human fertilisation and embryology legislation. Representations on the 
issues were made to the Science and Technology Committee. However, when the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 2008 was debated, Parliamentary time was not available for 
amendments to the abortion law. Consideration was then given to whether litigation might assist 
and BPAS obtained counsel’s opinion, which was favourable. Even at this stage, they hoped that 
clarification of the legal position might prompt policy consideration. The opinion was shared with 
the Department of Health hoping that it would promote the debate, at least by identifying the 
contrary legal arguments so that they could be explored. The BPAS saw the litigation as a last resort, 
not least because of the risks that it raised, rather than one of a number of alternative strategies.   
It may be that the Department of Health’s resistance to the case being brought by BPAS was driven 
by its concern to avoid abortion policy being made by and through the courts.165 Certainly, counsel 
for the Department placed considerable store on the fact that the drafting of the legislation made it 
clear that the decision whether to license particular classes of place, potentially including the 
woman’s home, was a matter for the Secretary of State through regulations.166 Both this approach 
and also the strategy adopted by BPAS seem to accept the position set out by Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in Bland that is preferable that Parliament should address the issues and the courts should 
only step in if there has been no opportunity for it to debate them. Thus, BPAS sought first to get 
Parliamentary consideration, and only sought a judicial ruling once it because clear that this would 
not happen. This sits comfortably with a constitutional theory in which Parliament is sovereign in 
matters of social and ethical controversy.  
The second example seems to show a different approach to constitutional legitimacy. This is the 
series of cases around death and dying since 2009. We have already noted the difference between 
the judicial approach in Purdy to that in articulated in Bland about the relationship between 
parliamentary sovereignty and judicial law-making and the discussion of this in Nicklinson. It can be 
argued that there is a similar difference in approach to be seen in the litigation strategies. The 
Director of Campaigns & Communications for ‘Campaign for Dignity in Dying’ has expressed a 
preference for Parliamentary law-making that seems to fit the same model as that expressed by 
BPAS: 
The law will change on assisted dying, and it is in everybody’s interests, both those 
sympathetic to change and those sceptical, that this comes about via Parliament and not the 
courts…. Until Parliament gets a grip on this issue the law will continue to be challenged in 
the courts and practice on the ground will evolve. There is an irony in this: if the vocal 
minority opposed to change continue to block legislation in Parliament, we could well end 
up with a more permissive system c/o (sic) the courts.167 
                                                          
165 We are grateful to David Lock QC for raising this question at the seminar. Penney Lewis makes a similar 
observation about the informal legal change in relation to non-therapeutic sterilisation, see n 6 above.  
166 BPAS v Sec State for Health [2011] EWHC 235 (Admin), at [20], discussing the Abortion Act, s 1(3A). This 
point was reiterated by Supperstone J at [30], [33] and [37]. 
167
 James Harris, ‘A change in the law on assisted dying – it’s not a question of if but how’, 8 August 2013, at 
www.campaignfordignityindying.org.uk/pages/blog/580/a_change_in_the_law_on_assisted_dying_it_s_not_a
_question_of_if_but_how_.html (last visited 23 August 2013). 
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However, it should be noticed that, unlike the issue being raised by BPAS, there has been extensive 
Parliamentary debate of the issue on which this group campaigns.  In a House of Lords debate, one 
Anglican bishop suggested the continuing campaign was ‘the old business of holding the referendum 
again and again until people give the right answer.’168 It seems not so much a litigation strategy with 
a constitutional hierarchy of deference to Parliamentary sovereignty as a campaign on all available 
fronts. This may require a different understanding of the constitutional legitimacy of test-case 
litigation.  
The judicial deliberations in the Nicklinson case indicate that one basis for such an understanding 
may lie in the role of the courts in relation to fundamental human rights. The Court of Appeal seems 
to have accepted the argument that deference to Parliamentary sovereignty did not absolve the 
courts of their obligations to consider the proportionality of interferences with human rights under 
Article 8 of the ECHR. As counsel for the applicants contended:  
Since the Article 8 right is engaged, it is always necessary for the court itself to carry out the 
proportionality exercise even where the circumstances fall within the margin of 
appreciation. The Divisional Court was obliged to carry out that exercise and was wrong to 
leave the field to Parliament. Even if that is a legitimate stand for the court to take when 
considering whether or not to develop the common law, it is not appropriate where 
fundamental Convention rights are in issue because it is the court’s job to protect them.169 
Test case litigation on the basis of fundamental human rights might be seen as more easily 
legitimated than campaigns based on a sense of moral outrage. The courts may be understandably 
more reluctant to wait for parliamentary action in cases where the applicants’ personal situation is 
very pressing than in those where it is less directly affected. The application of rules of standing, the 
exercise of discretion to give or withhold permission to intervene in cases may all be influenced by 
this sort of consideration of how parties are connected with the issues before the court. Given the 
proliferation of test-case litigation in the health care context, developing an account of their 
constitutional legitimacy seems an important task.170 
 
Conclusion 
We have shown that law-making in the context of health care and medical ethics is far more 
complex than the constitutional theory on which judges draw would suggest. Parliamentary 
sovereignty has become diffused through the authorisation of intermediate law-makers. Although 
the idea of deference to the jurisdiction of Parliament is attractive as an explanation of their role, it 
does not adequately explain the range of law-making decisions that we have identified. Further, we 
have identified a number of features of litigation that suggest that there are patterns within the 
work of legal personnel that influence the development of substantive law. There are also variations 
in the nature of the parties’ connections with the issues being placed before the courts that bear 
careful consideration. Each of these features needs to be accommodated in a more subtle account 
of constitutional legitimacy than has generally been articulated by the judges. The split in the Court 
                                                          
168 Hansard, House of Lords, 3 February 2010, Col GC72. See also Lord Carlile at GC74. 
169
 R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 961 at [69]. The Court goes on to undertake the 
examination that is suggested, so seems to accept the force of the point even without express approval. 
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 To be examined in a paper ‘Interferors and Intervenors’ currently in preparation. 
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of Appeal in the Nicklinson case demonstrates that this issue is still of current concern to the 
judiciary. 
Our analysis has identified ‘tiers of relative invisibility’ in law-making. At one end of the spectrum lies 
Parliament; in its capacity as the legislature it is the most visible lawmaker. Nonetheless, there are 
some ‘hidden’ aspects to the development of legislation, including the role of democratic 
lobbying.171 John Kingdon’s work in the US suggests that this needs to be placed in the wider context 
of agenda-setting and public policy formation.172 Our analysis has shown that law-makers 
demonstrate a desire to secure democratic as well as constitutional legitimacy, and suggests that 
such a wider context is integral to providing a satisfactory account of the proper approach to law-
making on the sort of controversial issues with which we are concerned. 
Further along the spectrum of visibility, judges might be considered ‘partially hidden’ law-makers 
inasmuch as their rulings are set out in judgments and there are clearly recognised constitutional 
issues raised by explicit judicial law-making. Of course, judges must determine the application of law 
to the facts of the case before them. However, how they go about addressing specific cases is 
instructive, and some judges appear keener than others to push the law in particular ways, or 
directions. Next we have placed ‘intermediate authorities’, which have a defined legal role, (eg 
regulatory bodies such as the General Medical Council (GMC) and HFEA discussed in Part 1) but 
where the processes by which they develop legal norms are not necessarily transparent.  
The players in litigation can be placed at the furthest end of the spectrum. It is not always clear 
whether litigants are seeking simply to resolve their own disputes or are litigating in order to further 
a particular agenda, perhaps as part of a sustained campaign by a particular organisation or group of 
interested parties. Sometimes such organisations (e.g. CORE or Campaign for Dignity in Dying) form 
the missing link between intermediate authorities and litigants, whereby ‘good’ cases might be 
sought by interest groups in furtherance of a strategic campaign. This is an area for further study. 
Our consideration of litigation has also led us to conclude that there are patterns that emerge from 
the way in which the legal profession is organised that deserve closer scrutiny in order to see 
whether it has an influence on the substantive law. We suggest that a number of activities that can 
properly be said to ‘make’ law are obscured in the course of litigation and deserve to be uncovered.  
The contributions of counsel and instructing solicitors to the evolving shape of the law are often 
under-estimated, as we have shown through illustrative examples. This information can perhaps be 
drawn out from readily available sources, but a considerable knowledge of the field will be required 
to identify any patterns. 
It seems clear, therefore, that the account given by the judges when explicitly addressing their role 
needs to be refined (at the very least). Our examples suggest that it may be possible to rely on an 
aspect of the Austinian theory that is rarely discussed, but could certainly be used to explain the 
judges’ understanding of their role; the idea of ‘tacit’ legislative commands. Here the argument is 
                                                          
171 Eg the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC), whose campaigns have included sending 
plastic model foetuses, postcards and videos to MPs during the passage of relevant legislation, including the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, as noted by Ms Short, Hansard, HC, Vol 171, col 257, and Ms 
Gordon, Vol 171, col 259, 24 April 1990. More recently, the Commission on Assisted Dying might be considered 
an example of a privatised form of lobbying, www.commissiononassisteddying.co.uk (last visited 05 August 
2013).  
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that where Parliament could intervene but chooses not to, then it can be assumed to legitimate 
judicial law-making by its acquiescence:  
The rules that he [the judge] makes derive their legal force from authority given by the state: 
an authority which the state may confer expressly, but which it commonly imparts in the 
way of acquiescence. For, since the state may reverse the rules which he makes, and yet 
permits him to enforce them by the power of the political community, its sovereign will ‘that 
his rules shall obtain as law’ is clearly evinced by its conduct, though not by its express 
declaration.173  
This approach avoids the potential clash between Parliament and the judiciary over legislative 
sovereignty and is echoed in the language used by judges.174 However, it is not clear how realistic it 
is to expect Parliament to exercise this oversight. It seems from the examples we have examined 
that the frustration of those campaigning around the ‘right to die’ with their failure to secure 
legislation has evinced some sympathy from the judges. It is also clear from our analysis of the law 
on human fertilisation and embryology that frequent Parliamentary intervention is unlikely. 
Arguably, the potential for this approach to provide a satisfactory constitutional account is 
dependent on some form of Parliamentary mechanism to keep the need for law reform under 
review. 
We have also seen that an alternative, or perhaps complementary, way forward would be a 
constitutional account based on the principle that deference to Parliament is limited by the proper 
role of the courts in protecting fundamental human rights. However, this too is problematic. Partly 
because the European Convention Human Rights is not specifically designed to deal with health care 
issues, and the UK is not a signatory to the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
(which does). Partly, this is because the contested issues with which we are concerned fall within the 
scope of the margin of appreciation and arguments about the limits of this doctrine bring judges into 
precisely the constitutional problems that the approach is trying to explain. The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has shown similar anxieties about being drawn into a pro-life or pro-choice 
position in relation to abortion and right-to-die cases, as we have drawn out in our discussion of the 
English cases.175 As noted in the Nicklinson case, the activity before the ECtHR around positive rights 
in relation to the ‘right-to-die’ is currently significant, but to date it continues to be reluctant to 
override democratic debate on this issue by resolving it as a matter of human rights.176 
Both a human rights model and a theory of democratic oversight through the idea of tacit legislative 
approval are worth further examination. Our study of hidden law-making has shown there is a very 
significant range of such activity in an area that is highly contentious. In our pluralist society it needs 
to be more soundly rooted in constitutional and democratic theory. Considerable work is required 
before the complexities of hidden law-making can be properly incorporated into the province of 
medical jurisprudence.    
 
                                                          
173 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: John Murray 1832), 28. 
174 n 96-98, above. 
175 See eg Vo v France [2004] 2 FCR 577 and Pretty v UK [2002] 2 FLR 45.  
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 Haas v Switzerland (2011) 53 EHRR 33; Koch v Germany (2013) 56 EHRR 6; Gross v Switzerland (application 
No 67810/10), 14 May 2013.  
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